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High downside risk to income and livelihoods is part of life in developing countries. 
Climatic  risks,  economic  fluctuations,  and  a  large  number  of  individual-specific 
shocks leave these households vulnerable to severe hardship. The paper explores the 
links between risk, vulnerability and poverty, taking a micro-level perspective. Risk 
does not just result in variability in living standards. There is increasing evidence that 
the lack of means to cope with risk and vulnerability is in itself a cause of persistent 
poverty and poverty traps. Risk results in strategies that avoid taking advantage of 
profitable but risky opportunities. Shocks destroy human, physical and social capital 
limiting opportunities further. The result is that risk is an important constraint on 
broad-based  growth  in  living  standards  in  many  developing  countries.  It  is  a 
relatively ignored part when designing anti-poverty policies and efforts to attain the 
Millennium Development Goals. The paper discusses conceptual issues, the evidence 
and the policy implications.  
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This paper discusses risk, vulnerability and their links with poverty. It will introduce 
some  recent  work  that  has  tried  to  highlight  the  crucial  role  played  by  risk  and 
vulnerability in determining people’s living conditions and opportunities to escape 
poverty. Many development practitioners and researchers have long recognised that 
individuals, households and communities face a large number of risks, related to for 
example  climate,  health  or  economic  shocks.  Different  disciplines,  including 
economics, geography and nutritional studies have analysed the consequences of life 
in this risky environment. Specific policies, such as preventive health care, safety nets 
or famine early warning systems form a well-established part of the aid and policy 
efforts in developing countries.  
 
It would therefore be wrong to suggest that risk has been largely ignored. However, in 
much analysis on development and in the design of anti-poverty policies it has largely 
remained on the periphery, an add-on in a more general analysis. This paper presents 
evidence that should encourage policy-makers to give risk and uncertainty a more 
central place in their thinking about poverty and destitution. The central argument is 
that risk  is not just another expression or dimension  of poverty, but it is also an 
important cause of persistent poverty and poverty traps.  
 
The term ‘vulnerability’ has been used in a variety of related but different meanings.  
In one of its most well-known definitions, Chambers (1989) stated that vulnerability 
“refers  to  exposure  to  contingencies  and  stress,  […]  which  is  defencelessness, 
meaning  a  lack  of  means  to  cope  without  damaging  loss”  [p.1].    The  World 
Development  Report  2000/01  made  ‘security’  a  central  part  of  the  framework 
underlying  its  analysis.  It  provided  a  number  of  related  definitions,  of  which 
“vulnerability measures […]. – the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in 
well-being” [p.139] is most relevant for our purposes. Alwang, Spiegel and Jorgenson 
(2001) present a number of different definitions as found in the literature. A common 
thread appears to be that vulnerability relates to a sense of insecurity, of potential 
harm people must feel wary of – something bad may happen and spell ruin. In this 
paper, we use vulnerability as the existence and the extent of a threat of poverty and 
destitution;  the  danger  that  a  socially  unacceptable  level  of  well-being  may 
materialise.  
 
In our analysis, we will focus on risk-related vulnerability: the exposure to risk and 
uncertainty, the responses to these, the welfare consequences, and the implications for 
policy. The downside risk people face is a central ingredient in this analysis. It is also 
useful to make clear what we are not intending to do. The term ‘vulnerability’ is used 
in  some  research  and  definitely  in  policy-analysis  in  another  sense,  referring  to 
particular ‘vulnerable groups’, such as the elderly, orphans, widows or even more 
generally, the landless or low-paid workers. In these cases, vulnerability is used as 
referring to some more general ‘weakness’ or ‘defencelessness’. Such groups may 
face risk-related vulnerability as well, but their defining characteristic is not related to 
risk, but to their general inability to take advantage of profitable opportunities, so that 
without substantial support they may well end up in severe and persistent poverty. A 
focus on these groups is obviously justified, but it is not the focus of this paper, which 
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narrow  focus,  even  if  some  of  the  instruments  that  would  help  for  risk-related 
vulnerability would also assist ‘vulnerable groups’. Section 5 will develop this policy 
focus further, building on the earlier findings in the paper.  
 
The  next  section  will  first  briefly  introduce  some  of  the  typical  findings  and 
implications of risk on household welfare, but also focus on the strategies people use 
to cope with risk and shocks. This will lead to the core part of the analysis in section 
3, where risk and shocks as a cause of poverty will be discussed. In particular, the 
exposure to risk and the responses and actions taken by households to cope with risk 
conspire to result in poverty persistence or even poverty traps, whereby households 
are stuck permanently in poverty, unable to take advantage of sufficiently profitable, 
yet risky activities. One of the key consequences is that the possibility for broad-based 
growth is undermined.  
 
In section 4, the paper considers whether considering vulnerability has any bearing on 
much of the current debate of getting better ways of measuring poverty. Not only 
concepts such as income or consumption poverty, but also attempts to operationalise 
‘capabilities’ and the inherent ‘multidimensionality’ of poverty are effectively derived 
in a world of certainty, in which risk and vulnerability has little room. In this section, 
some  efforts  to  measure  vulnerability  will  be  discussed.  When  trying  to  measure 
vulnerability, the paper will do so by assessing the extent of the threat of poverty, 
measured ex-ante, before the veil of uncertainty has been lifted. This can be compared 
to poverty, which is itself an expression of the extent of low welfare outcomes, but as 
observed without uncertainty and whereby low welfare results from outcome levels 
below some accepted poverty line. After highlighting the policy implications of the 
analysis in the paper, section 5 concludes. Throughout the analysis, the paper will 
highlight recent examples from the literature, and report of some more recent findings 
of my own work with collaborators on Ethiopia. 
 
Finally, it is worth briefly defining what is meant by ‘risk’ in this analysis. Risk is 
used as potential states of the world, exogenous to the person. Which state of the 
world  will  occur  is  not  known  to  this  person. In  economic  analysis,  it  is  usually 
assumed that the person has formed a (subjective) distribution of the likelihood of 
particular states occurring, and much of the analysis underlying some of the papers 
quoted below makes this assumption. The fact that risk is exogenous does not mean 
that it affects all people in the same way. Some risks may be irrelevant, for example, 
frost is irrelevant for a farmer growing only crops that do not suffer from occasional 
frost. A crucial ingredient of the analysis below will also be that households try to the 
shape the impact of risk by a variety of risk strategies.  
 
A common distinction is between risk and uncertainty, whereby in the latter case 
those states of the world are included which the person could not have foreseen even 
possibly occurring, and in any case does not take specifically into account in any 
strategies.
2 It is hard to ignore the fact that uncertainty defined in this way may well 
exist,  as  the  recent  Tsunami  highlighted.  While  for  much  of  the  analysis,  the 
distinction  is  not  crucial  and  not  emphasised,  it  will  be  picked  up  again  in  the 
discussion of the policy response to risk and vulnerability. 
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2. Risk and Vulnerability: a central part of poor people’s livelihoods 
 
One of the more striking findings in much qualitative work using short and longer 
lifetime histories and other methods is that an essential part of the life of the poor is 
trying to cope and survive in the face recurring misfortune – such as illness, loss of 
employment, harvest failure (for plenty of examples, see the background papers for 
the Voices of the Poor work, as part of the preparations for the World Development 
Report 2000/01).  
 
These shocks can take on a variety of forms but many can lead to substantial loss of 
income, wealth or consumption. There are different ways of recording these, but a 
simple household questionnaire-based investigation in rural Ethiopia yielded that over 
a five-year period (1999-2004), virtually all households, 95 percent to be precise, 
reported  to  have experienced a  shock  that  had  caused  substantial  loss  of income, 
assets or consumption. Table 1 reports the breakdown. Of those households hit by a 
shock, 47 percent reported that a drought had affected them, 43 percent that a death 
and 28 percent that an illness in the household had seriously affected them. Other 
instances, such as marketing, pests, crime or policy/political issues were investigated 
as well, and while important for specific people, in general they were less important.
3 
 
Table  1: The incidence of serious shocks 1999-2004 in rural Ethiopia 
Type  of  shocks  households  reported  to  be  affected  by,  leading  to 
serious loss of assets, income or consumption, of those affected by a 
shock (note: 95 percent of households reporting such a shock) 
Percentage 
Drought  46.8 
Death of head, spouse or another person  42.7 
Illness of head, spouse or another person   28.1 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices  14.5 
Pests or diseases that affected crops  13.8 
Crime  12.7 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices  11.3 
Policy/political  shocks  (land  redistribution, state  confiscation of assets, 
resettlement, forced contributions or arbitrary taxation) 
7.4 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock  7.0 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, 2004, and Dercon, Hoddinott and Woldehanna (2005). 
Based on recorded three worst shocks per household, leading to serious loss of income, consumption or 
assets. 95 percent of households report at least one serious shock.  
 
This evidence is of course only suggestive at best. One of the most thriving parts of 
the analysis of risk and shocks in developing countries has been the study of the 
mechanisms people use to cope with these shocks. Indeed, these mechanisms have 
been widely acknowledged as a central part of people’s livelihoods. To begin with, 
households have strategies to cope ex-post with shocks, to smooth consumption and 
nutrition when shocks happen, even if formal credit markets and insurance are not 
available. They may use savings, often in the form of live animals, built up as part of 
                                                
3 Similar questions had been asked to the same households a decade earlier, see Dercon (2002) or the 
World Development Report, 2000/01, p.140, table 8.2. The recall period was longer in this case, so 
only the relative importance of shocks offers a suggestive comparison. The pattern is not dissimilar 
with one exception: the issue of taxation, land expropriation and other ‘policy’ related problems were 
then  the  second  most  important  category  of  problems  reported,  with at  least  42  percent  reporting 
taxation or forced labour and 17 percent reporting land expropriation problems. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 5 
 
a precautionary strategy against risk, or engage in informal mutual support networks, 
for example, clan- or neighbourhood-based associations, or even more formal groups 
such as funeral societies.
4  
 
However,  group-based  systems  cannot  work  effectively  in  the  face  of  ‘covariate’ 
shocks,  affecting  the  whole  group,  while  the  lack  of  good  stores  of  wealth,  with 
limited risks, also mean that building these ‘buffer stocks’ is highly costly and indeed 
not as effective as hoped for. On the latter, an example is that when households in 
Northern Wollo in Ethiopia tried to use their standard smoothing device – selling 
small and larger livestock – to cope with the drought and famine in the mid-1980s, 
livestock prices collapsed due to oversupply and lack of demand, in the face of high 
grain prices, providing a classic case of entitlement failures as in Sen (1981). 
 
Overall,  it  tends  to  be  found  that  households  manage  to  keep  consumption  and 
nutrition smooth to some extent, but by no means entirely (Townsend, 1995, Dercon, 
2002).  Large  covariate shocks are  typically  not  insured  and for  some or  in  some 
settings, also idiosyncratic (household-specific) shocks are affecting outcomes. For 
example, table 2, based on the Ethiopian rural used in table 1, gives the regression 
results using a simple specification linking consumption per adult in 2004 (almost 80 
percent of which is basic food consumption) to initial conditions in 1999 in terms of 
household demographics, land, livestock, and other household characteristics, as well 
as community fixed effects. As can be seen, reporting a serious drought shock in the 
last two years is correlated with 16 percent lower consumption, while a shock in the 
preceding two years is still reducing consumption by 14 percent (suggesting slow 
recovery).  A  problem  in  local  markets  linked  to  declining  crop  prices  or  lack  of 
demand in recent years reduced consumption by 19 percent. Note that all these shocks 
are typically ‘covariate’ – affecting many people in the same community, and by 
nature hard to insure. But, at the same time, many of the reported shocks, typically 
idiosyncratic ones, appear to have had relatively limited impact on consumption, and 
in any case not systematically a significant impact on those reporting the event. The 
only significant idiosyncratic shock relates to illness between 3 and 5 years ago, but 
not recent ones. One possible explanation is that some of the immediate effects of 
illness  can  be  handled  by  mutual  support  and/or  savings,  but  illness  can  have 
debilitating effects (in terms of productivity) in the medium term. 
 
                                                
4 In particular in economics, the ‘consumption smoothing’ and ‘risk-sharing’ literature has thrived, and 
indeed they are examples where work on developing countries has heavily influenced the mainstream 
research agenda. Surveys  of  this literature are found in  Townsend (1995), Deaton (1997),  Dercon 
(2002), Morduch (2004).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 6 
 
Table 2: Impact of shocks on (log) consumption per capita, 2004  





Drought, 2002-04  -0.163  2.46** 
Drought, 1999-2001  -0.137  2.72** 
Pests or diseases that affected crops, 2002-04  -0.006  0.07 
Pests or diseases that affected crops, 1999-2001  -0.052  1.05 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock, 2002-04   -0.002  0.18 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock, 1999-2001  0.022  0.24 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices, 2002-04  0.055  0.63 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices, 1999-2001  0.001  0.02 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices, 2002-04   -0.187  2.23** 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices, 1999-2001  -0.026  0.36 
Lack of demand for non-agricultural products, 2002-04   -0.037  0.19 
Lack of demand for non-agricultural products, 1999-2001  -0.195  2.28** 
Crime shocks, 2002-04   -0.018  0.36 
Crime shocks, 1999-2001  0.083  0.99 
Death of head, spouse or another person, 2002-04  0.043  0.69 
Death of head, spouse or another person, 1999-2001  -0.001  0.02 
Illness of head, spouse or another person, 2002-04   -0.019  0.32 
Illness of head, spouse or another person, 1999-2001   -0.151  2.33** 
R
2  0.34   
Sample size  1290   
Notes: 
1.  Specification  includes  controls  for  Female  headship,  age  head,  schooling,  household  size, 
dependency  ratio,  land  holdings  (quintiles),  livestock,  ethnic  minority,  religious  minority,  holding 
official position in PA or important place in social life, all in 1999. PA dummies, month of interview 
dummies and perceptions of rainfall in previous harvest year are also included but not reported. 2. 
Standard errors are robust to locality cluster effects.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 
5%  level.  Source:  Ethiopian  Rural  Household  Survey  1999-2004,  and  Dercon,  Hoddinott  and 
Woldehanna (2005). 
 
This inability to smooth consumption has implications for poverty in a direct way: 
households  may  drift  occasionally  under  some  socially  acceptable  level,  possibly 
bounce  back  up  and  drift  back  in.  Uninsured  shocks  result  then  in  poverty 
fluctuations, and this is indeed what has been found in data sets. A concept that allows 
some assessment of this is ‘transient poverty’ as distinct from ‘chronic poverty’, as 
formalised  by  Ravallion  (1988).  The  chronically  poor  are  defined  as  those  with 
average consumption below the poverty line. Chronic poverty for an individual can 
then  be  measured  using  average  consumption  as  the  welfare  indicator.  Transient 
poverty for an individual is the average poverty over time minus chronic poverty. 
Aggregation using procedures as in standard poverty measures provides an overall 
measure  of  transient  poverty.    The  definition  involved  is  not  restricted  to  the 
headcount so that the overall poverty measure may contain elements of chronic and 
transient poverty for each individual. Using these definitions, Ravallion (1988) finds 
that  about  half  of  total  poverty  is  transient  in  the  ICRISAT-sample;  Jalan  and 
Ravallion (1996) find high transient poverty in panel data from four provinces in rural 
China: about half of the mean squared poverty gap is transient. In Ethiopia, using 
earlier data from the ERHS (1994-1995), it was found that about 36 percent of the 
poverty gap was transient poverty.  
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 7 
 
While useful, there is an important problem related to the use of transient poverty, as 
defined above. Transient poverty is measured as a residual, and as a consequence it 
contains all the measurement error that may bedevil the concept and measurement of 
consumption. The regression in table 2 can provide an alternative means of assessing 
the relevance of ‘transient’ poverty, defined in the same spirit but not calculated as a 
residual  but  using  the  direct  shock  measures.  Simple  simulations  can  provide  an 
estimate of the contribution of particular shocks to poverty. In particular, consumption 
can be predicted for the case in which the shocks would not have occurred, to allow 
some estimate of ‘chronic’ poverty, while ‘transient’ is the poverty added due to the 
shocks.
5 It is also straightforward to calculate the contribution of each  significant 
shock to overall poverty. Table 3 reports these for the significant shocks, grouped as 
‘drought’, ‘markets’ and ‘illness’ shocks, using the headcount index of poverty, based 
on an absolute poverty line defined as the consumption level needed to reach some 
minimal basket of basic needs.  
 
Table 3: The impact of shocks in 1999-2004 on poverty in 2004 
  Head 
count 
Actual poverty  47.3 
Predicted poverty (based on table 2)  43.8 
Predicted poverty without drought shocks  33.1 
Predicted poverty without illness shocks  40.4 
Predicted poverty without input/output markets shocks  41.2 
Predicted poverty without shocks  29.4 
Transient as share of total (predicted) poverty  32.8 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 2004. The poverty line is a revalued poverty line based on 
the 1994 round of the same survey, valued at 61.48 birr in 2004 prices. Based on 1370 complete 
observations. Note that the transient poverty share is calculated relative to the predicted poverty level.  
As an estimate of ‘national’ poverty, it is deficient in terms of offering a comparison with national and 
other figures, since methods differ. 
 
Drought shocks have had the most serious impact, contributing the largest share of 
transient poverty in this period. Overall, poverty would appear to have been only 
about 29 percent, but is about 50 percent higher due to the occurrence of shocks (i.e. 
shock-related transient poverty accounts for about a third of total poverty). In other 
words, if these shocks had been insured and smoothed, either via household strategies 
or  via  interventions,  then  poverty  would  have  been  substantially  lower  in  rural 
Ethiopia by 2004 by a third.  Doing the same calculations but based on a distribution-
sensitive  poverty  measure  (such  as  the  squared  poverty  gap),  then  the  share  of 
transient in total poverty is predicted to be even larger, at about 47 percent. These 
estimates are high, but also cover a difficult period in Ethiopia’s recent history, with 
development efforts, aid and reforms first stalled due to the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, 
and then subsequently, a serious drought affecting large parts of the country in 2002.  
 
These figures can be viewed as a first order approximation of the poverty reduction 
that could be gained from removing transient poverty, and the inability of current 
                                                
5 Some caution is needed in using this information. If unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the 
direct shock terms, then what we may be picking up is not the impact of the shock, but some other 
characteristic, correlated with observing particular shocks. Arguably, we may then be measuring that 
unobserved characteristic and not the impact of the shock   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 8 
 
policies and interventions to deal with shocks. Indeed, it is this type of concern that is 
behind much of the ‘safety net’ thinking, whereby the presence of a real risk that 
individuals’ and families’ may experience poverty episodes due to shocks justifies 
more intervention to avoid this. But, at the same time, it can be inferred from this 
analysis, that there is another group, arguably deserving and needing more of our 
attention: those that rarely if ever manage to get outcomes above the socially accepted 
poverty line, the destitute or ‘chronic’ poor. These are the poor that even without 
shocks would have been predicted to be poor in 2004, based on their characteristics in 
1999. In that view, ‘safety nets’ or more in general, policies that focus on managing 
the risks faced by people in developing countries are more of a luxury, that threaten to 




This is a powerful argument against a focus on risk and shocks, but incorrect or at 
least incomplete. Risk and shocks have further implications for poverty: they are a 
cause of poverty. One cannot ignore that the actions people take to reduce the impact 
of  risk  have  poverty  implications  as  well.  First,  households  are  organising  their 
livelihoods  taking  risk  into  account,  ex-ante,  before  any  shocks  materialise.  A 
standard  example  is  income  diversification,  whereby  activities  and  assets  are 
diversified, so that risks are spread, or the formation of low-risk activity and asset 
portfolios, with activities skewed to more certainty, at the expense of mean returns. 
Indeed,  we  observe  rural  and  urban  households  in  developing  countries  usually 
engaged in a variety of crops, some with low risks but low mean returns, keeping 
different small and larger livestock, being involved in a multitude of petty business 
activities,  temporary  migration,  etc.  (for  reviews  on  the  evidence  for  this,  see 
Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 2002). However, a key issue is that these diversified or low 
risk portfolios, while offering lower overall risks, may come at the expense of mean 
returns, if compared to more profitable but more risky activities and asset portfolios. 
This may well mean that households may have to choose to be relatively poor, to 
avoid even more serious hardship and destitution, induced by shocks. This is one 
mechanism through which risk may be a cause of poverty.  
 
A second mechanism for poverty to be caused by risk is related to assets lost or 
destroyed due to shocks. Despite the fact that households actively try to manage risk, 
shocks  affect  them,  and  at  best,  the  evidence  suggests  only  partial  smoothing  of 
welfare and nutrition. Assets, and more in general, households’ livelihoods and their 
ability to generate future income is affected, in part due to the necessity to cope with 
shocks, so that assets are sold-off, or more directly, the asset base is often directly 
affected by the shocks – such as death of livestock or a loss of human capital due to 
illness or temporary poor nutrition.  
 
Both mechanisms imply that risk can be a cause of poverty and that the concept of 
transient versus chronic poverty is misleading: if anything, poverty related to risk is 
underestimated when using ‘transient’ poverty, and the true poverty cost of risk is 
                                                
6 It has to be admitted that this is straw man, set up to destroy in the rest of the paper and ‘hard’ 
evidence of this view is not easily found. However, it was most prominently present during the period 
of ‘social dimensions to adjustment’ in the 1980s and 1990s, whereby it was considered necessary to 
set up ‘temporary safety  nets’ to cushion the possible hardship following retrenchment and public 
sector reform, as an afterthought in the context of stimulating growth as the key means to reduce 
poverty. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 9 
 
substantially higher. But how substantial is an empirical issue, and the next section 
turns to some of the emerging evidence on this. 
 
3. Risk and Vulnerability as a Cause of Poverty 
 
There are at least three literatures on development issues that have long recognised 
that risk is an important factor, explaining levels of poverty and deprivation. It is 
helpful to briefly discuss them, and explain how they fit in with the more general 
issue of risk as a cause of poverty, as argued in this paper. The first is the fertility 
literature, where it is commonly argued that high infant and child mortality, i.e. the 
risk that children will not survive beyond a certain age, increases the fertility rate. 
This rise often puts pressure on women’s health and well-being, and can cause e.g. 
some of the well-documented externalities on environment, land pressure and well-
being  of  others  (for  a  careful,  balanced  discussion  on  these  issues,  see  Dasgupta 
(1993)). Behind this view are more general arguments of the family-level benefits of 
more labour or old age security, not least in circumstances of limited entitlement to 
alternative social protection measures. Note that this is an example whereby the risk 
inherent in living conditions induces ex-ante behavioural responses by households 
(effectively an over-investment in children), that may well divert resources from more 
profitable assets. 
 
A second literature is largely based on evidence from agricultural economics although 
is making a broader point, well-established in basic textbook economics. It focuses on 
preferences  towards  risk,  and  more  specifically  risk  aversion  (a  preference  trait, 
whereby people are willing to pay to avoid being faced with a risky choice, in favour 
of a less risky choice). Risk aversion will lead to profitable opportunities not being 
taken up in favour of less risky choices with lower expected returns. There is wide 
evidence of behaviour consistent with risk aversion, and more importantly, of risk 
aversion  to  be  higher  when  expected  incomes  are  lower,  not  least  in  developing 
countries  (Newbery  and  Stiglitz,  1981;  Binswanger,  1981).    It  leads  to  a  well-
established  view  that  the  ‘poor’  are  more  risk  averse,  and  this  will  contribute  to 
persistence in poverty, since they will not take the entrepreneurial risk required to 
enter into particular profitable activities.
7 While some of the points made have some 
link with this view, it will be argued that its emphasis on preferences is essentially 
misleading both as a complete theory of how risk causes poverty and as a guide to 
policy. 
 
A  third  literature  is  the  nutrition  literature,  whereby  poor  nutrition  in  particular 
periods  in  a  child’s  early  life  may  contribute  to  poorer  ‘long-term’  nutrition 
circumstances,  in  the  form  of  stunting  (height-for-age  levels  below  some  level 
observed in healthy populations).  Short-term shocks to nutrition may then lead to 
lower  nutritional  outcomes  in  the  long-run  as  well,  i.e.  a  persistent  health  effect. 
While there is evidence for this process, this is not exactly borne out by all studies: 
some have suggested that ‘catch-up’ remains possible: i.e. that over time children may 
                                                
7 The fact that the expanding experimental literature on risk and preferences has questioned the validity 
of some of the underlying behavioural models for this analysis is not necessarily changing this view. 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s work has shown that ‘risk aversion’ may not be the appropriate concept, but 
instead that agents, at any level of income do not like losses, leading to a concept of ‘loss aversion’. 
Ideas of ‘safety-first’, while seemingly not consistent with most experimental evidence, would also 
entail preference-led persistence in poverty. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 10 
 
recover the lost nutrition and return to their personal growth curve. Again, this is an 
empirical issue, and most evidence would suggest that stunting is a serious, permanent 
problem, not least in early years, since evidence suggests a strong correlation between 
child height at age three and adult height (Martorell, 1995, 1999).
8  
 
These nutritional effects may have far reaching consequences. Children with slow 
height  growth  are  found  to  perform  less  well  in  school,  score  poorly  on  tests  of 
cognitive  functions and  develop  slower.  Short  adult  height  is correlated  with  low 
earnings and productivity, poorer cognitive outcomes and premature mortality due to 
increased  risk  of  cardiovascular  and  obstructive  lung  disease.  Taller  women 
experience  lower  risks  of  child  and  maternal  mortality.  In  the  case  of  adults,  an 
increasing body of evidence links adult weight or BMI
9 (the Body Mass Index, also 
known as the Quetelet Index) to agricultural productivity and wages (Dasgupta, 1993; 
Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, 
1990).  Low  BMI  is  correlated  with  a  large  number  of  health-related  indicators, 
including early onset of chronic conditions and increased risk of premature mortality 
(North, 1999).  
 
For  our  purposes,  it  is  interesting  to  trace  these  effects  from  direct  evidence  on 
shocks,  but  beyond  its  nutritional  impact  and  to  broader  outcomes.  To  take  one 
example, Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2004) trace the impact of the 1982/83/84 
droughts in Zimbabwe, as well as exposure to the civil war preceding independence, 
on longer-term measures of child health and education in the 1990s in a rich panel 
data set in  particular resettlement areas. They focus  on shocks on children in  the 
critical 12-24 month age category – generally recognised as the most critical time for 
child growth. These children were interviewed again 13 to 16 years later. Using an 
instrumental variables estimator, with maternal fixed effects, they show that lowered 
stature as a pre-schooler leads to lowered stature in late adolescence as well as delays 
in school enrolment and reductions in grade completion. The magnitudes of these 
impacts  are  meaningful.  Using  careful  estimation  methods,  they  found  that  the 
1982/83/84 drought shock resulted in a loss of stature of 2.3 centimetres, 0.4 grades of 
schooling, and a delay in starting school of 3.7 months for this particular age-group. 
Using  the  values  for  the  returns  to  education  and  age/job  experience  in  the 
Zimbabwean manufacturing sector provided by Bigsten et al. (2000, Table 5), the 
impact of the shock translates into a 7 per cent loss in lifetime earnings. 
 
These  permanent  effects  from  effectively  transitory  events  are  not  restricted  to 
nutrition or health. Lack of insurance and credit markets implies that recovery of 
assets lost to cope with a crisis or destroyed by it will not be straightforward and 
immediate. For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show that bullocks are one 
of  the  mechanisms  used  to  cope  with  shocks  in  their  rural  South  Indian  setting, 
resulting in sub-optimal levels of capital goods. These effects are also not restricted to 
physical capital: for example, studies in India have found that negative income shocks 
caused households to withdraw children from schools. Even if children may later on 
return to school, this causes lower educational levels, affecting the children’s ability 
to build up a better life for themselves (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1995).  Recent work on 
Zambia has shown that teacher absenteeism, closely linked to illness shocks in the 
                                                
8 The discussion of the evidence is based on Dercon and Hoddinott (2004). 
9 BMI is the Body Mass Index, defined as weight in kg, divided by the square of height in meters.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 11 
 
context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, reduces cognitive achievement by children, again 
affecting long-term outcomes (Das, Dercon, Habyarimana and Krishnan, 2004). 
 
This evidence would suggest processes in which incomes and levels of well-being are 
permanently affected by  transitory shocks. It is possible to conceptualise these as 
poverty  traps
10,  equilibrium  levels  of  poverty  from  which  there  is  no  possible 
recovery  without  ‘outside’  intervention.  One  mechanism  could  be  the  classic 
nutrition-productivity poverty trap (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). It is well established 
that  below  some  critical  nutritional  level,  no  productive  activity  of  any  sort  is 
possible. So if during a crisis, all assets are wiped out except for a person’s labour, 
and if the crisis also pushes the person’s nutritional status below this threshold, there 
is no hope of ever recovering using own productive means. Only a serious windfall, 
such as in the form of aid, could induce the person to climb out of poverty, provided it 
is sufficient to pass the threshold value of nutritional status. While the evidence for 
this to be a direct description of actual poverty traps is limited, it provides a useful 
narrative for more general poverty traps: there may be thresholds in some productive 
assets – if pushed below these asset thresholds, the person finds no possible recovery, 
but rather an equilibrium level of very low asset holdings and poverty. Barrett and 
Carter  (2004)  use  evidence  from  Kenya  to  suggest  that  such  thresholds  can  be 
observed at least among pastoralists, given that minimum herd sizes are required for 
possible accumulation and escape from a potential ‘asset poverty trap’.  
 
The  existence  of  poverty  traps  has  been  tested  more  directly  by  Ravallion  and 
Lokshin  (2000)  and  Jalan  and  Ravallion  (2004)  for  Bulgaria  and  China.  Most 
interestingly, they find no evidence of poverty traps, but in any case, of relatively long 
persistence of the effects of shocks: it takes many years to recover, and the recovery 
was longer for the poor. Their method exploited the insight that transition paths of 
incomes or consumption, when poverty traps exist, would be non-linear and allowing 
for multiple equilibria. Another way of looking at whether there is evidence of long-
lasting effects from shocks was used by Dercon (2004), using a subset of the same 
panel data households reported in tables 1 to 3.
11  
 
In  this  paper,  detailed  data  were  exploited  on  the  experience  during  the  1984/85 
famine,  more  specifically  the  extent to  which  households  had  to  resort  to famine 
coping strategies, such as cutting meals and portions, selling valuables, relying on 
wild foods and moving to feeding camps. An index of these experiences in the mid-
1980s was then introduced in a model of consumption growth based on data from 
1989  to  1997,  regressing  changes  in  food  consumption  on  initial  levels  of  food 
consumption at the household and community levels and a number of common and 
idiosyncratic shocks.  Note that  if shocks only have transitory effects, then lagged 
shocks should have no effect. However, it was found that rainfall shocks several years 
before the period in which growth was measured, still affect growth. Most strikingly, 
                                                
10A poverty trap can be defined as an equilibrium outcome and a situation from which one cannot 
emerge  without  outside  help,  for  example,  via  a  positive  windfall  to  a  particular  group,  such  as 
redistribution or aid, or via a fundamental change in the functioning of markets. Poverty traps are often 
conceptualised  as  caused  by  the  presence  of  increasing  returns,  although  other  mechanisms  are 
possible, such as credit market failures or externalities. Dercon (2004) has a review of models relevant 
for poverty analysis, as has Barrett (2004).  
11 This paper did not allow for the non-linearities implied by multiple equilibria, as in more direct tests 
of poverty traps. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 12 
 
the  extent  of  the  famine  impact,  as  measured by  the  index  of  severity  of  coping 
strategies, strongly affected growth in the 1990s. This growth impact was substantial: 
depending  on  the  estimation  method,  comparing  the  25th  and  75th  percentiles  of 
households  in  terms  of  the  severity  of  suffering,  the  latter  had  about  4  to  16 
percentage  points  lower  growth  in  the  1990s,  a  period  of  on  average  substantial 
recovery of food consumption and nutrition levels after crisis and war in the 1980s. 
Furthermore,  it  took  on  average  ten  years  for  livestock  holdings,  a  key  form  of 
savings and assets for accumulation in rural Ethiopia, to recover to the levels seen 
before the 1984-85 famine. 
 
Table 4: Testing for persistent effects of shocks on food consumption growth. 
Dependent variable: change in ln food consumption per adult between survey waves 
(1989-94 and 1994-97). Hausman-Taylor and Jalan and Ravallion estimators. 
￿ln food cons 
(1) (HT) 
￿ln food cons 
(2) (JR) 
 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
Ln food consumptiont-1  -0.318  0.000  -0.204  0.000 
Village mean ln food const-1  0.211  0.000  0.135  0.004 
Rainfall shockst  0.622  0.000  0.614  0.002 
Rainfall shockst-1  0.069  0.016  0.195  0.013 
Adult serious illness  -0.043  0.076  -0.053  0.064 
Crop shock (-1 is worst)  -0.014  0.757  -0.217  0.041 
Livestock  shock (-1 is worst)   -0.018  0.704  -0.009  0.910 
Severity of famine impact  -0.116  0.079  -0.397  0.068 
Constant  0.519  0.000  0.920  0.071 
Number of observations  636  319 
Source: Dercon (2004), table 6. Regression (1) uses the Hausman-Taylor model, and assumes rainfall 
shocks,  livestock  shocks  and  crop  shocks  as  time-varying,  exogenous  variables,  and  demographic 
changes,  illness  shocks  and  lagged  consumption  at  household  and  village  levels  as  time-varying 
endogenous variables. The index of the severity of the crisis experienced (coping index) was treated as 
time-invariant exogenous, as was (if applicable) whether there was a road available. As time-invariant 
exogenous variables and instruments, the presence of harvest failure during the famine period, the 
estimated percentage of households suffering in each village and the logarithm of livestock before the 
famine were used. Regression (2) uses the Jalan-Ravallion estimator (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002). 
 
In general, we have only limited evidence on persistent effects of shocks but this is 
largely related to the lack of data available for this purpose. Still, careful analysis of 
available evidence can typically also uncover some of these effects. An example is 
recent work on the longer-term impact of the Indonesian crisis in 1998. Suryahadi, 
Sumarto  and  Pritchett  (2003)  estimated  that  the  poverty  rate  more  than  doubled 
between the outset of the crisis and  its peak,  effectively one  year. The results in 
Thomas  et  al.  (2004)  suggested  that  there  was  some  disinvestment  in  schooling, 
particularly amongst the poorest households. Subsequently, GDP recovered fast, and 
positive growth was restored by 2000, and poverty may even have fallen between 
1997  and  2000  (Strauss  et  al.,  2004).  Lokshin  and  Ravallion  (2005)  argue 
nevertheless  that  this  hides  a  geographically  diverse  picture.  Using  a  series  of 
extensive cross-section data sets, they find that living standards in many districts are 
still affected by the shock, even five years after it began, and three years after the 
sharp recovery. They suggest that a majority of those living below the poverty line in 
2002  would  not  have  done  so  except  for  the  1998  crisis:  in  other  words,  they 
experience persistent poverty effects from the 1998 shock.  
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All this evidence is related to a persistent or permanent effect from a shock, so that 
uninsured risk is a cause of poverty. There is also evidence of the other effect: that the 
mere presence of uninsured risk changes household behaviour in terms of investment 
and activity portfolios. The fertility example at the start of this section can be viewed 
in  this  way.  Beyond  the  fertility  example,  there  is  further  evidence  that  such 
behaviour may be directly linked to risk and be a cause of perpetuating poverty. In 
Morduch (1990), using the ICRISAT sample, it is shown that asset-poor households 
devote a larger share of land to safer traditional varieties of rice and castor than to 
riskier but  higher-return varieties.  Dercon (1996)  finds  that Tanzanian households 
with  limited liquid assets  (livestock) grow proportionately  more  sweet potatoes, a 
low-return, low-risk crop. A household with an average livestock holdings allocates 
20 percent less of its land to sweet potatoes than a household with no liquid assets. 
The crop portfolio of the wealthiest quintile yields 25 percent more per adult than that 
of  the  poorest  quintile.  Choosing  a  less  risky  crop  portfolio  thus  has  substantial 
negative consequences for incomes. 
 
Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993)  suggest  that  the  portfolio  of  activities  (and 
investments)  in  the  ICRISAT  villages  is  affected  by  high  risk.  Increasing  the 
coefficient  of  variation  of  rainfall  timing  by  one  standard  deviation  reduces  farm 
profits  of the  poorest  quartile  by  35  percent;  for  the  richest  quartile  the  effect  is 
negligible.  Efficiency  is  affected,  and  the  average  incomes  of  the  poor  decline. 
Wealthier farmers are not affected and are therefore able to earn higher incomes. This 
phenomenon affects the wealth distribution: 54 percent of wealth is held by the top 20 
percent of households. Jalan and Ravallion (2001) cite other examples, focusing on 
both asset and activity portfolios, although their evidence is more mixed.  
 
In  a  careful  study,  Elbers  and  Gunning  (2003)  use  simulation  based  econometric 
methods  to  calibrate  a  growth  model  that  explicitly  accounts  for  risk  and  risk 
responses,  applied  to  panel  data  from  rural  Zimbabwe.  They  found  that  risk 
substantially reduces growth, reducing the capital stock (in the steady state) by more 
than  40  percent.  Two-thirds  of  this  loss  is  due  to  ex-ante  strategies  by  which 
households try to minimize the impact of risk, i.e. the build-up of livestock holdings 
to cope with consumption risk.  Dercon and Christiaensen (2005), using the same data 
set on Ethiopia discussed above, find a significant increase in fertiliser use if some 
insurance were to be offered against downside consumption risk, since when rains 
fail,  financial  returns  to  fertiliser  use  are  typically  negative.    They  reach  this 
conclusion from finding significant sensitivity of fertiliser use to the predicted levels 
of consumption when rains were to fail. Since they also control for actual current 
levels of assets, it is clear that the problem is not just a matter of seasonal credit.  
 
These results on the impact of uninsured risk on assets, activities and technology 
choices do  not follow simply from  differences in risk preferences: controlling for 
preferences, those with less access to insurance possibilities select a low-risk, low-
return portfolio while the others take on a riskier set of activities. These results reflect 
the constraints on the options available to specific households, and not simply the risk 
preferences of households, as some of the earlier agricultural economics literature 
mentioned earlier often would let us believe: reducing these choices as only governed 
by preferences belittles the problems faced by households in their efforts to cope with 
uninsured risk. As Kochar (1995) notes, “the set of options faced by farmers offers 
little role for preferences” (p. 159). The behaviour of the poor with few insurance QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 14 
 
possibilities may look as if they have more (innate) risk-averse preferences, but it is 
the lack of insurance and credit, and the set of options available to them that forces 
them to take less risk and therefore forego income (see Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989, 
for a careful theoretical discussion).
12   
 
In sum, there is increasing evidence that uninsured risk increases poverty, through ex-
ante behavioural responses, affecting activities, assets and technology choices, as well 
as through persistent and possibly permanent effects from transitory shocks via the 
loss of different types of assets. This clearly has important implications for the design 
of policies, putting strategies to reduce risk and the vulnerability it entails at the core 
of poverty reduction efforts. But given that poverty concepts rarely incorporate risk, 
in  the  next  section,  the  emerging  literature  on  the  possible  use  of  a  concept  of 
vulnerability to poverty, as guide to policy making, is discussed.  
 
4. Vulnerability as a Normative Welfare Concept 
 
 
The preceding analysis has emphasised that uninsured risk (ex-ante) has potentially 
serious consequences for poverty, as  measured in  observable ex-post  outcomes in 
income, consumption, health, education and other dimensions. If, however, risk and 
uncertainty are an essential part of a person livelihood and well-being, then it begs the 
question  whether  vulnerability  as  a  concept  or  dimension  of  welfare  would  not 
deserve more attention as well.  
 
Recent  years  have  seen  an  evolution  to  view  multidimensionality  as  part  of 
mainstream thinking about poverty. Some have viewed it as a progression in keeping 
with a basic needs approach, emphasising the attainment of ‘human development’ 
outcomes,  such  as  education  and  life  expectancy  (as  in  the  UNDP  Human 
Development  Reports),  while  others  have  brought  in  a  more  eclectic  view,  for 
example, as reflected in the 2000/01 World Development Report, which emphasised 
poverty as a lack of opportunities, vulnerability and insecurity, and lack of power.  All 
appear  to  have  embraced  the  broad  thinking  on  well-being  entailed  in  Sen’s 
‘capabilities approach’, emphasising that poverty is the lack of freedom to achieve 
particular outcomes, broadly defined (Sen, 2000). Some of these achieved outcomes 
or ‘functionings’ could be measured and are essentially multidimensional, while the 
means to achieve – such as incomes or endowments – are only ‘instrumental’ to well-
being.  
 
On the basis of much of the preceding analysis, it would be appropriate to emphasise 
the ‘instrumental’ role of risk, as a cause of poverty and deprivation. Viewed as such, 
it has a role on the analysis of poverty but it does not ask for a further consideration in 
any discussion of appropriate concepts of well-being. However, it could be argued 
that the risk of being poor and the uncertainty about one’s ability to secure decent 
living conditions  in the future are essential parts  of the experience of well-being. 
Concepts  of  ‘capabilities’  and  ‘achieved  outcomes’  without  recognising  risks  to 
                                                
12 A possible source of confusion in the literature is the concept of ‘asset integration’ (see for example, 
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981), arguing that risk preferences should be measured relative to final wealth 
levels. With imperfect credit and insurance markets, wealth is a constraint in the choice set and other 
constraints could be entered in assessing the behaviour towards risk, but this is arguably different from 
assessing preferences, before constraints on choices are considered. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 15 
 
translate capabilities in outcomes may miss an important element or dimension of 
well-being.  More  specifically,  measuring  achieved  outcomes  in  health,  nutrition, 
consumption, longevity or education would miss the point that ex-ante they could 
potentially have been better or worse. Furthermore, given that risk would intrinsically 
be linked to all other dimensions of well-being, it can hardly be seen as a separate 
dimension.  
 
Poverty measurement, made operational via the measurement of achieved outcomes, 
tends to involve three steps: the choice of a welfare indicator, the identification of the 
‘poor’ via some norm, the poverty line, and an aggregation procedure. However, the 
entire  analysis  tends  to  take  place  in  a  world  of  certainty:  poverty  measures  are 
defined after all uncertainty surrounding the individual welfare indicator has been 
resolved. In many instances this does not have to be a serious problem. For example, 
when assessing the impact of a new transfer scheme after it has been introduced, data 
on  its  actual  impact  and  the  resulting  poverty  outcomes  are  obviously  relevant. 
However,  when  deciding  to  commit  resources  to  competing  schemes  ex-ante, 
evaluating which one will be more effective to reduce poverty will have to take into 
account  potential  outcomes  in  different  states  of  the  world.  Furthermore,  the 
possibility of serious hardship contains information relevant for assessing low well-
being. For example, consider two families, both with the same expected consumption, 
above some accepted norm, but one with a positive probability of hardship, and the 
other one facing no uncertainty. Neither is expected to be poor, and ex-post we may 
observe them to have the same consumption, but surely the possibility of downside 
risk for the former has some bearing on the ex-ante analysis of welfare.  
 
It  is  surprising  that  the  calculus  of  risk  has  not  systematically  entered  into  the 
(welfare-economic  or  quantitative)  analysis  of  poverty  until  fairly  recently.  Even 
Sen’s (1981) seminal contribution on famines is in its welfare analysis concerned with 
the ex-post consequences of the crisis  in terms of  poverty  and destitution.  Policy 
analysis is done with the benefit of hindsight, even though the sequence of events 
unfolding during the Bangladesh famine in 1974 and the realised outcomes were just 
one set among a number of possible scenarios ex-ante.  
 
In the rest of this section, I will introduce some recent work on vulnerability concepts 
and measurement. Our concern is not to give a unified descriptive ‘positive measure’ 
of vulnerability, whereby we would claim to describe a person’s or society’s welfare, 
but  rather,  in  the  same  spirit  as  in  poverty  measurement,  a  normative  analysis, 
whereby all value judgements used to construct a measure are explicit, as a tool to 
conduct  analysis  and  design  policy,  for  example  to  prioritise  interventions.
13 
Furthermore, we will briefly comment on attempts to operationalise this concept. 
 
                                                
13 There has obviously been a long debate whether welfare measurement in economics can ever be 
‘positive’, i.e. devoid of value judgements, going back to Friedman and others. In the context of risk, 
economists typically use the ‘expected utility’ framework, a weighted average of the satisfaction linked 
to  each  outcome,  weighted  by  the  probability  of  the  state  in  which  it  would  occur.  It  is  used 
descriptively, as if decision-making by households implies that they implicitly or explicitly maximise 
this. But even when using this as a descriptive concept for individual welfare, one has to enter the 
realm  of  normative  economics  as  well  as  when  aggregating  to  obtain  society-wide  measurement. 
Poverty  analysis,  by  focusing  on  specific  welfare  indicators,  evaluated  using  a  specific  norm  and 
aggregated by attributing weights to outcomes, is explicitly normative. Sen (2000) and his previous 
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We can define vulnerability as the magnitude of the threat of poverty, measured ex-
ante, before the veil of uncertainty has been lifted.
14 This can be compared to poverty, 
which  is  itself  the  magnitude  of  low  welfare  outcomes,  as  observed  without 
uncertainty  and  whereby  low  welfare  is  defined  as  outcome  levels  below  some 
accepted poverty line. The focus is on exposure to the threat or the danger of low 
welfare outcomes, i.e. downside risk, not just risk in general.  
 
Let the vulnerability of a particular person be measured by  
V*=V(z,y,p) 
 
where z is the poverty line, y is a vector of outcomes across n states of the world, and 
p  is  a  vector  of  corresponding  probabilities.  It  may  be  easiest  to  think  of  these 
outcomes as consumption levels, but we shall avoid such language as an effort to 
stress our measure is suitable to other well-being dimensions.
15 
  
Vulnerability is then a function of outcomes, a norm and the probabilities linked to 
each  outcome.  Many  functions  could  be  imagined.  To  narrow  this  down  for  a 
measure, it is possible to define a number of desirable properties of a vulnerability 
measure. With a close parallel to well-known poverty axioms (e.g. Foster and Sen, 
1997)  and  definitions  of  risk  (e.g.  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz,  1970),  consider  six 
desiderata: (i) symmetry (only outcomes matter, and all states of the world are treated 
in the same way), (ii) focus (we only focus on outcomes at or below the ‘norm’; those 
above  are  only  valued  as  the  norm),  (iii)  probability-dependent  outcomes  (in  the 
measure, the impact of a change in the outcome in a particular state should only 
dependent on the probability of that state), (iv) probability transfer (an increase in the 
probability for a better state at the expense of the probability of a worse state should 
not  increase  vulnerability),  (v)  risk  sensitivity  (the  presence  of  risk  increases 
vulnerability) and (vi) scale invariance (the units in which z and y are measured do 
not matter). Calvo and Dercon (2005) has more discussion about the intuition behind 
these statements. They show that these six axioms are sufficient to obtain a narrow 
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 , v(.) is monotonically decreasing and convex and ￿i=Min(yi,z) (i.e. yi, 
but censored at z). This simply reads as the probability-weighted average of some 
(convex) function of outcomes, so that the worst states of the world get no lower 
weight (and higher, if strictly convex) than good states.   
 
A number of measures have been used in recent research that could be compared to 
this result. Both Ligon and Schechter (2003), and Elbers and Gunning (2003) take a 
utilitarian stance and view vulnerability as ‘low’ expected utility, where ‘low’ can be 
further specified by defining some minimum socially acceptable utility level. Ligon 
                                                
14 The rest of the analysis in this section is based on Calvo and Dercon (2005). 
15 Recall the parallel with individual poverty measures which can be written as Pi*=P(z,yi), but then 
only one outcome yi needs to be considered. Aggregate poverty indices that aggregate over Pi* also 
aggregate over a vector of different yi, but then aggregation is over individuals not over states of the 
world (as it will be the case with V*).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 17 
 
and Schechter’s work uses a measure that may violate scale invariance and especially 
the focus axiom, and thereby they do not focus on downside risk but on all risk for the 
welfare assessment, in line with expected utility. Their utilitarian (or ‘welfarist’) view 
of vulnerability leads to some (arguably) peculiar normative results. For example, 
given  the  existence  of  serious  downside  risk,  a  person’s  vulnerability  would  be 
reduced by responding to the existence of that danger by increasing her outcomes in 
exceptionally good states of the world (for example, increasing the cash prize in the 
national lottery would then be part of a vulnerability reducing policy).  
 
Another  set  of  measures  were  inspired  by  Ravallion  (1988).  Christiaensen  and 
Subbarao (2004), Suryahadi and Sumarto (2003), Kamanou and Morduch (2004), and 
Chaudhuri, et al. (2002) are recent examples. They all see vulnerability as expected 
poverty. As poverty is usually measured by FGT indices (Foster et al., 1984), here we 
may write vulnerability (V
EP) as  









- ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿  where a￿0, 
 
If a>1, then all our axioms thus far are satisfied, but not for 1￿a. This is an important 
caveat, because the empirical literature resorts to both the probability of being poor 
(a=0)  and  the  expected  shortfall  (a=1)  with  great  frequency.  For  example,  0<a<1 
implies  that  increased  risk  will  reduce  vulnerability,  while  a=0  would  violate  the 
probability transfer axiom. Moreover, even though a>1 would secure all our axioms, 
it also proves to be a troublesome condition, as it imposes that better outcomes will 
exacerbate the extent to which the individual dreads an increase in risk exposure, in 
spite of empirical evidence to the contrary (Ligon and Schechter, 2003).   
 
Two further axioms offer some better alternatives: normalisation (so that the measure 
is bounded between 0 and 1) and constant relative risk sensitivity (a proportional 
increase  in  the  outcomes  of  all  possible  states  of  the  world  leads  to  a  similar 
proportional increase in the certainty-equivalent outcome, implying inter alia that 
better outcomes will reduce the extent to which the individual dreads an increase in 
absolute risk exposure).
16 A straightforward measure, satisfying all these axioms, is as 
follows:  
 
i V* 1 x
a
a ￿ ￿ = - ￿ ￿
￿
, 








 and ￿i=Min(yi,z), and where 0<￿<1 and E is the expectation 
sign. The parameter ￿ can be interpreted as a weight, reflecting risk sensitivity. Given 
outcomes,  normalised  by  the  poverty  line  and  weighted  by  the  risk  sensitivity 
parameter,  vulnerability  is  one  minus  the  probability  weighted  value  of  these 
normalised and weighted outcomes.  
 
To be clear about what we have obtained in this way: it is a measure of individual 
vulnerability, a valuation ex-ante of possible welfare levels, taking into account a 
poverty norm and risk sensitivity. As an individual measure, it provides a basis for 
comparison  between  individuals  in  terms  of  their  vulnerability.  Vulnerability  is 
                                                
16 Alternatively, one could impose absolute relative risk sensitivity. See Calvo and Dercon (2005) for 
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distinct from poverty: a crucial distinction is when it is measured, before or after the 
veil of uncertainty is lifted. But anyone who is poor with certainty ex-post, will also 
have  (non-zero)  vulnerability  ex-ante,  since  all  possible  outcomes  are  below  the 
norm.
17  Similarly, all ex-ante actions to minimize exposure to risk (such as entering 
into low-risk activities at the cost of low return) would be reflected in the overall 
valuation  of  vulnerability,  and  the  focus  is  not  just  on  risk  but  on  all  possible 
outcomes. For example, take two individuals, one with a certain flow of outcomes at a 
level below the norm in each state of the world, and another individual, otherwise 
similar, but with some outcomes above the norm and some below in particular states 
of the world. Vulnerability measurement would provide a clear quantification of the 
relative position of these individuals, based on the threat of poverty. Admittedly, the 
approach is however by necessity ignorant about whether the individuals themselves 
would judge the other’s implied vulnerability higher or lower than their own. 
 
Quite a number of papers have tried to apply vulnerability related to the discussion 
above to data, although most appear to have focused on the probability of being poor 
(i.e. the expected headcount), with the drawbacks reported above. Furthermore, they 
tend to focus on reporting the head line figures. Just as with poverty analysis, these 
head line figures are less interesting and less helpful for policy design, even though 
they end up the only reported evidence. A more fruitful approach would be to make 
profiles:  finding  the  correlates  of  higher  and  lower  vulnerability,  based  on  initial 
conditions, household and community histories and policy measures. This type of 
application is still rare. One example is Ligon and Schechter (2003), who derive a 
vulnerability  measure  (albeit  in  the  expected  utility  mode,  assuming  relative  risk 
aversion,  and  not  just  focusing  on  downside  risk)  and  regress  it  on  some 
characteristics  using  data  from  Bulgaria.  They  find  that  education  substantially 
reduces vulnerability – for example those with college education are on average 37 
percent  less  vulnerable.  Households  living  in  urban  areas  are  (surprisingly)  more 
vulnerable, while land holdings have no impact on vulnerability and owning farm 
animals reduces vulnerability. Possibly, in post-communist Bulgaria, the countryside 
can manage the vulnerability linked to change more easily. The sex of the head has no 
impact, while larger households are more vulnerable, although having more employed 
members or having members drawing a pension reduces vulnerability.  
 
                                                
17 So statements such as ‘person x is not vulnerable but outright poor’ and ‘person y is vulnerable if she 
is not poor but …’ are not statements that could be helpfully made using our concept, or at best reflect 
confusion about what is observed and when. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 19 
 
Table 5: Correlates of vulnerability (based on total consumption) in Bulgaria in 
1994. Based on table 2, Ligon and Schechter (2003). 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard error 
Primary Education  −0.0717  (0.0321) 
Secondary Education  −0.2356  (0.0354) 
Post-Sec. Education  −0.3350  (0.0377) 
Male headed?  −0.0300  (0.0256) 
Age  0.0083  (0.0047) 
Age Squared  −0.0000  (0.0000) 
Owns Animals?  −0.1001  (0.0259) 
Land Cultivated in ha   −0.0011  (0.0025) 
Urban?   0.0758  (0.0262) 
# of Pensioners in hh.   −0.1183  (0.0212) 
# of Employed in hh.  −0.3095  (0.0237) 
Family Size   0.2426  (0.0137) 
Note: These regressions also include province dummies. Details on variables and method in Ligon and 
Schechter (2003). 
 
Just as with standard (ex-post) poverty profiles, it should therefore be possible to 
generate  multivariate  vulnerability  profiles  for  different  contexts,  and  make 
statements  on  the  relative  differences  in  vulnerability  between  different  types  of 
households in different localities. However, one crucial part of the analysis has thus 
far been ignored: how to generate the possible outcomes in different states of the 
world, necessary for vulnerability measurement. And this is not straightforward: one 
needs a forecasting model for outcomes and the necessary data to estimate or calibrate 
a distribution of future outcomes using only information available ex-ante. 
 
In recent years, it has proved very tempting for many researchers to use the limited 
available data in a number of contexts for this purpose. Some use creative but rather 
glorious  and  ultimately  unsatisfactory  assumptions  to  exploit  estimated  and 
parameterised  error  distributions  from  cross-section  data to  derive  distributions  of 
potential outcomes, usually consumption (see for example, Chaudhuri, et al., 2002). 
Others  used  relatively  short  panel  data  sets  to  calibrate  more carefully  models to 
generate outcome distributions, although typically by necessity with relatively simple 
dynamics (for example, Ligon and Schechter (2003)). Alternatively, a more dynamic 
structure was imposed in Elbers and Gunning (2003).  Ultimately, all these studies 
have to rely on backward-looking information while the purpose is to derive forward-
looking outcome distributions – of course, a problem very familiar to the time-series 
forecasting literature. And as in this literature, a careful Monte-Carlo simulation study 
also  showed  that  the  appropriateness  of  different  forecasting  models  used  in  the 
vulnerability  literature  will  effectively  depend  on  the  underlying  time-series 
properties  of  the  outcome  data,  such  as  whether  outcomes  are  following  a  non-
stationary or a stationary process
18 (Ligon and Schechter, 2004). If consumption or 
other outcomes are stationary, then even a short panel or even a cross-section may 
well contain sufficient information for an appropriate forecasting model to determine 
                                                
18 A stationary series can be understood as observations derived from a data generating process that has 
stable  mean  and  variance.  In  our  context,  this  would  mean  that,  for  a  particular  household,  the 
distribution of the outcome variable is identical in each period. A non-stationary series would not have 
this property. An example would be if consumption were to follow a random walk: i.e. any shock has a 
permanent impact so that the best prediction of the current level is the last period’s level.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 20 
 
vulnerability.  But  if  outcomes  are  non-stationary,  then  these  models  would  be 
inappropriate.  
 
This is an empirical issue, but with short panels, this is hard to address. Even more 
problematic, if some of the processes described in the previous section are prevalent, 
such  as  the  possibility  of  a  shock  permanently  changing  the  underlying  income 
process,  stationarity  would  be  violated,  but  it  would  be  hard  to  detect  such  non-
stationarity in very short panels. Overall, the best bet would be to develop careful 
dynamic models and more work is definitely needed in this respect, but long panel 
data  are  typically  missing.  Does  this  mean  that  this  endeavour  is  by  necessity 
doomed?  Not  necessarily;  the  growth  in  good  quality  data  sets  for  developing 
countries is impressive, and it is definitely a direction worth considering further.
19  
 
5. Policy Implications and the Way Ahead
20 
 
The presence of uninsured risk results in welfare losses. For the poor, it is a reason for 
substantial hardship. At present, many poor people are not offered opportunities to 
insure themselves against this hardship, while the support offered when shocks occur 
is often limited. Viewed like this, this justifies public action to foster more insurance 
and mechanisms to protect the poor. In the presence of insurance and credit market 
failures, there is a further issue: given their exposure to downside risk, the poor may 
enter into activities and asset portfolios with low risk, but also low returns. While this 
reduces their exposure to downside risk, in turn it affects their long-term income and 
their ability to move out of poverty in the long-run. Furthermore, shocks may have 
long-lasting effects: productive assets may be destroyed or sold off to survive, health 
may be undermined or children may be taken out of school. All these actions lead to a 
lower future income-earning potential of the current and future generation. The result 
is higher poverty that may persist.  
 
The  presence  of  risk-reducing  but  low-return  strategies  on  the  part  of  households 
trying to reduce their vulnerability as well as the occurrence of shocks with long-
lasting effects both suggest that uninsured risk may lead to poverty traps: there is 
persistence in poverty, caused by market imperfections, the presence of risk and the 
household’s responses to it. Temporary support may avoid households to fall into the 
trap, and may also lift them out. In fact, given that market failures contribute to the 
existence of these traps, there may be efficiency gains from interventions, so that 
transfers  focused  on  these  groups  may  be  productivity  enhancing,  without  an 
efficiency-equity trade-off. This provides a strong justification for focusing aid on 
these problems, not least in a context of promoting broad-based growth. In fact, even 
in a growing economy, these processes may otherwise mean that these groups may 
well  end  up  staying  behind,  since  they  cannot  take  advantage  of  new  profitable 
opportunities, undermining the poverty impacts of growth.  
 
This paper has presented evidence supporting this view, but it could be argued that 
this is not a wealth of evidence. There is a need to establish much more firmly the 
                                                
19 One issue ignored in this discussion is the time scale over which vulnerability is being measured – 
next year, in the next five years? In principle, prediction models can be constructed for different time 
spans, but again, the errors involved in these predictions will be dependent on the underlying properties 
of the series and the quality of the prediction model. 
20 This section is partly based on Dercon (2004), chapter 19. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 21 
 
quantitative importance of these effects in different contexts. More empirical work on 
the short and long-run consequences of uninsured risk on poverty and growth in the 
developing world is a priority. One should also not overstate the role ‘insurance’ can 
play  in  promoting  poverty  reduction.  If  some  forms  of  structural  inequalities  are 
behind persistent poverty, then offering ‘full insurance of risk’ to everyone would 
simply make these inequalities permanent.
21   
 
Even with this proviso, the case for fostering better risk-focused social protection
22 
seems strong, justifying public action and the allocation of budgetary resources to its 
provision. But this does not settle the issue of the form public action should take. 
State  involvement  is  an  obvious  option,  but  encouraging  NGOs,  local  social 
institutions and the private sectors to provide more insurance and protection should 
not  be  ignored.  A  general  state-run  system  of  universal  social  insurance  and 
substantial direct means-tested transfers may seem an admirable ideal from an equity 
point of view, but it is unlikely to be the most cost-effective system, involving high 
administrative  costs  and  possibly  substantial  incentive-related  inefficiencies.  The 
informational  requirements  make  this  generally  unfeasible  in  poor  countries  with 
limited budgets and administrative capacity anyway. Still, it does not mean that public 
action cannot achieve substantial improvements in risk-related social protection, even 
given limited means.  
 
Possible measures can be classified in two categories: first, ex-ante measures that 
result in the poor and vulnerable taking action to reduce risk impact or take out more 
insurance, before the veil of uncertainty has been lifted; secondly, ex-post measures 
that provide transfers to the poor when they face bad shocks that remained uninsured. 
Ex-ante  measures  would  provide  incentives  and  means  to  the  poor  to  protect 
themselves  better  against  hardship:  examples  are  supporting  self-insurance  via 
savings, assisting income risk management by providing access to credit, supporting 
community-based risk-sharing and encouraging the introduction of insurance products 
tailored  to  poor  contexts.  Ex-post  measures  would  provide  a  genuine  safety  net, 
appropriately targeted to the poor but large enough in scale and coverage to provide 
broad-based  social  protection  at  some  minimally  accepted  and  feasible  level  of 
standard of living. It  could  be part of a more general  welfare support system, or 
specifically  targeted  for  risk-related  hardship.  All  these  options  will  be  briefly 
discussed below.  
 
                                                
21 Banerjee (2004) warned about another problem: providing more insurance in the form of protection 
against downside risk may provide incentives for more risk-taking so that the poor take on high return, 
risky investments. But this may undermine their access to credit markets, if moneylenders and banks 
need sufficient incentives for the borrower to repay in case the project fails. Social protection and 
safety nets may reduce these incentives, so the poor may become more excluded from credit markets. If 
they need access to these  markets  to  grow  out of  poverty, they may  become locked  in long-term 
poverty because of social insurance such as the presence of a safety net. The empirical significance of 
this effect is unknown, but worth exploring.  
22 The term ‘social protection’ as used in this concluding section is rather narrow, and often qualified 
with  ‘risk-focused’.  The  term  is  used  to  focus  on  measures  that  support  managing  risk  and  the 
reduction of risk impact on the population and the poor in particular. Often, social protection is more 
broadly used to include as well the general or targeted welfare policies, including redistribution efforts 
and targeted transfers, without any risk focus. The paper does not try to argue that these broader social 
protection policies are not important (on the contrary), but rather, that there is much mileage to be had 
from focusing on social protection with a specific risk-related vulnerability focus, as is done in the 
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Introducing new  insurance products  In recent years,  microfinance institutions and 
even insurance companies in developing countries have started to design and provide 
insurance  products  for  low-income  clients.  Life  and  health  insurance  are  most 
common. Nevertheless, relative to micro-credit programmes, they are typically still 
relatively limited. What scope is there for experimenting and expanding insurance 
products? First, it is worthwhile to recall some of the main reasons for the lack of 
insurance  to  start  with.  Market-based  insurance  requires  a  high  information 
environment  while  problems  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  will  limit  the 
extent to which insurance providers would be willing to offer insurance. Problems 
with enforcement of payouts for claims undermine the willingness of clients to take 
out  insurance.  A  possible  solution  for  this  credibility  problem  requires  the 
establishment  of  reinsurance  markets,  but  this  is  not  self-evident.  Non-market 
insurance may benefit from a better information environment but there is no scope for 
insurance of  important covariate or infrequent  risks. Both  market and non-market 
insurance  solve  some  of  the  information  problems  they  face  by  excluding  certain 
groups and individuals from their arrangements.  
 
Could micro-insurance, in the form of the provision of simple, low-cost insurance 
contracts, tailored to low-income clients provide a way out? Such contracts need to 
overcome  the  same  information  and  enforcement  problems  as  market-based 
insurance, and the small scale of the contracts will make transactions costs high. Still, 
just  as  with  micro-credit,  it  could  provide  a  service  to  low-income  clients  that 
otherwise  would  remain  rationed  in  the  market,  even  if  it  would  mean  rather 
substantial subsidies. It is nevertheless helpful to emphasise some differences with 
micro-credit provision. First, the enforcement problem in credit is faced by the loan 
provider, but in insurance, it is a problem for the client. Secondly, with credit, there is 
repeated interaction between borrower and lender during the repayment period and 
this implies regular transactions and monitoring costs. In the case of insurance, the 
information content of the regular payment of the premium is rather limited, while 
there are only small transactions costs for the provider, since the insurance can be 
easily withdrawn when the premium is not paid. For the provider, transactions costs 
are irregular and only high when a claim comes in. Finally, reinsurance is essential to 
keep the costs of insurance provision low. This implies the need for regulation, high 
quality  of  actuarial  data  and  the  certification  of  events  to  allow  this  reinsurance 
market to function.  
 
The need for reinsurance and the costs of verification of claims imply that the types of 
risk that can be insured at relatively low cost are limited. Certain events may be easily 
verifiable – such as death or serious illness – so that life and health insurance may be 
obvious contracts to start with. But even in those cases there may be problems. To 
avoid adverse selection, there would be a need to exclude certain groups, based on 
disease (such as AIDS) or age – but these are groups that may suffer serious hardship 
without insurance. Reinsurance would require systems of certification – but what if in 
certain locations with poor institutions it may be easy to obtain false death or poor 
health certificates?   
 
In general, there is surprisingly little research on micro-insurance, at least compared 
to the vast micro-credit literature. There is also little or no systematic evidence on 
how existing risk-sharing or other social institutions could be mobilised to provide a 
basis for more widespread insurance provision for different types of risk. The main QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 23 
 
requirement  now  is  to  obtain  empirical  evidence.  This  also  implies  the  need  for 
experiments  combined  with  research,  preferably  in  the  form  of  ‘natural’  micro-
insurance experiments to evaluate its impact. 
 
Alternative insurance products could also be promising. Weather-indexed bonds are 
one such example. A key advantage is that claim verification is straightforward: a key 
source of losses is insured, not the loss itself
23. Still, given the high covariance of 
rainfall and other climatic factors across regions and countries, the development of 
reinsurance markets covering large geographic areas would be particularly important 
in this case. Whether products for weather or catastrophic risk can be introduced in 
some of the poorest countries remains to be seen, although there is some encouraging 
evidence emerging (Skees et al., 2004).  
 
Promoting more self-insurance via savings and micro-credit Besides designing and 
supplying better insurance products for the poor, there is also scope for assisting the 
poor  in  protecting  themselves.  There  is  substantial  scope  for  more  self-insurance 
provided  better  savings  instruments  suitable  for  the  poor can  be  offered  (Dercon, 
2002). Key problems with existing self-insurance via assets is that they tend to be 
risky and may well be strongly covariate with incomes, limiting their effectiveness, 
while financial savings products are typically not tailored to the poor, offering low or 
negative returns, and involving prohibitive transactions costs.  
 
As an area for subsidised intervention and regulation, it also does not suffer from the 
important informational problems affecting credit and insurance. There is no issue of 
adverse selection or moral hazard, nor any serious reinsurance issues. The main issues 
are potentially high transactions costs and the need for credibility of the institution 
(Morduch and Sharma, 2002). With few exceptions, such as SafeSave in Bangladesh, 
initiatives  remain relatively thin on the ground.  Most savings instruments  within 
microfinance institutions still appear to be mostly used as instruments for accessing 
micro-credit – for example, as a means of developing reputation and commitment. 
Flexible savings instruments for precautionary motives are usually not encouraged.   
 
This  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  further  role  for  more  standard  micro-credit 
products, on the contrary. Increasing assets and incomes, that in turn allow savings to 
increase  offers  a  virtuous  cycle  to  provide  a  buffer  against  future  hardship. 
Furthermore, access to credit can serve as a means of insurance, allowing the poor to 
borrow  in  bad  years  against  future  incomes.  Finally,  since  profitable  sources  of 
income, suitable for diversification purposes in an income risk management strategy 
often involve important set-up costs, small loans could have a very large impact on 
income risk exposure. Overall, however, this requires that microfinance institutions 
offer flexible products that allow the poor to enter into credit despite being faced with 
substantial risk. One possible route would be to provide interlinked contracts, which 
typically offer more efficient outcomes than separate credit and specific insurance 
contracts – a standard solution for mortgage lending products in developed countries. 
An example would be to link credit with health insurance. There is substantial room 
for more experimentation and research on such products. 
                                                
23 Developing weather insurance tailored to the poor may be less straightforward. It would require 
verifiable records on rainfall. But if the poor tend to live in marginal areas with limited agricultural 
wealth, few rainfall stations are likely to be available at present. Unless the local rainfall is highly 
covariate with rainfall in ‘richer’ areas, rainfall insurance would not offer much protection to them. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 24 
 
 
The role of targeted transfers Ex-ante measures may provide substantial protection, 
but ultimately they cannot fully insure individuals and families. Informal mechanisms 
only  offer  limited  insurance.  Micro-insurance  products  will  have  to  be  simple, 
insuring only specific, highly observable risks, while high risk groups may have to be 
excluded by design. The existence of certain risks, for example catastrophic risks, can 
hardly be anticipated beforehand. Self-insurance fails if shocks happen to materialise 
in successive periods. All self-protection strategies require some outlay beforehand, at 
times  high  to  guarantee  the  sustainability  of  the  institution,  and  the  poorest 
households may not be able to afford this, while credit to pay for insurance may not 
be available. Finally, the presence of uncertainty as distinct from risk (the unknown 
unknowns) also implies that household strategies and market-based products would 
fail in particular circumstances. In short, some ex-post measures, providing transfers 
to those affected by uninsured risk, would always be necessary as part of a risk-
related social protection system.  
 
This is not the place for an exhaustive discussion on the scope and form of a transfer-
based safety net. A few issues are relevant for our discussion. For example, targeting 
support is probably the most efficient solution given limited means, but one should be 
aware of the potential errors of targeting, especially for those requiring support but 
excluded due to imperfections in the targeting design. Self-targeted programmes may 
seem  most  attractive,  where  the  design  of  the  programme  ensures  incentives  for 
participation  only  by  the  target  group  and  not  by  others,  so  avoiding  costly 
identification of the beneficiaries. Workfare programmes such as food-for-work are 
often designed in such a way, but the return to the beneficiaries has to be kept low to 
ensure incentives for others not to participate. Coverage is typically not complete: 
certain groups may not be reached by such programmes, for example, women that 
have to look after children may not find the time to take part. Alternative targeting 
schemes, such as allowing community leaders to select beneficiaries or schemes based 
on observed characteristics (such as nutritional status or livestock ownership) have 
their own costs and problems (Conning and Kevane, 2000; Ravallion, 2002). In the 
case of uninsured risk transfers, the question of who should be targeted is also not 
self-evident. In principle, for an efficient safety net, one should arguably be most 
concerned  with  reaching  those  for  whom  protection  will  avoid  poverty  traps  or 
persistence, via their effects on investment and activity choice. Given the problems of 
identifying those currently poor, it is unlikely that one can identify these using any of 
the possible targeting methods.  
 
The ex-ante and ex-post measures discussed above are relatively strictly focused on 
risk. However, at least as important would be to build-in risk-related dimensions in 
more standard policy interventions. Just as risk is intrinsically linked to processes of 
income generation and asset formation, any programme focused on income generation 
and asset formation should recognise these risk dimensions. Consider the following 
two examples.  
 
Promoting modern inputs adoption Since the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian government 
has been promoting the adoption of modern input packages, provided on seasonal 
credit with strict repayment enforcement, often involving local government officials. 
In the early years, with good rains, adoption was increasingly rapidly since mean 
returns were very high. However, after a series poor harvests, repayment enforcement QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS149   Page 25 
 
resulted in serious hardship for some in some areas and adoption flattened as well. It 
remains the case that mean returns are high in many areas, but clearly in poor rainfall 
years, returns are very low and possibly negative given the need to repay the credit. A 
credit  product  with  some  insurance  element,  for  example  weather-indexed,  would 
surely be superior in this high climatic risk environment.  
 
Conditional cash transfer programmes In the 1990s, a number of programmes were 
introduced inspired by the Progresa programme in Mexico whereby families receive a 
cash transfer conditional on children enrolling and attending school. The incentive 
appears  to  have  resulted  in  substantial  increases  in  enrolment  and  other  positive 
welfare effects. However, the programme design ignores possible risk, while evidence 
in other settings has shown that school attendance may well be responsive to income 
shocks (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1995). It has been suggested that even in the Progresa 
setting, such effect can be found so that a more efficient conditional cash transfer 
programme would have included some element of ‘insurance’ whereby cash transfers 
vary, for example on the basis local climatic and other circumstances.
24  
 
It is an empirical issue to determine whether particular programmes focused on risk, 
or including some risk considerations are effective. There is a dearth of evidence at 
the moment, and often all possible interventions are reduced to more standard safety 
nets. While in some settings this may be the most appropriate response, much more 
field-testing and experimentation with alternative programmes, in the context of well-
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